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Abstract 
We compare measures of the tone of parties’ campaigns in the 2015 General Election in England, 
based on, respectively, coverage of parties’ campaigns in six national newspapers, citizens’ 
perceptions, and expert judgements. It is the most extensive study of such measurements outside 
the U.S. and one of very few to include expert judgements. We find that citizen perceptions and 
expert judgements are heavily affected by partisan bias. We show how these biases can be 
eliminated with a regression-based procedure. After such adjustment seven of the eight resulting 
measures of parties’ campaign tone (five based on newspapers, one on citizen perceptions and one 
on expert judgements) are strongly correlated. The eighth measure (based on one of the 
newspapers) depicts the tone of parties’ campaigns very differently owing to different criteria of 
what to cover in a campaign. Each of the three kinds of empirical information is adequate as a basis 
for measuring parties’ campaign tone, but adjustment for partisan biases is essential for perception 
and judgement data. Common apprehensions about the ‘subjectivity’ of citizen perceptions are not 
to be justified, while expert judgements are equally useful, as long as sufficient information is 
available to eliminate their partisan bias.  
Keywords: Negative Campaigning, Measurement, Newspaper campaign coverage, Expert Survey, 
citizen Perceptions, Partisan Bias, bias correction, convergent validity 
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Introduction  
The extensive literature on negative campaigning and its effects on voters’ attitudes and behavior 
contains very few studies that assess the quality and validity of campaign tone measures. Notable 
exceptions are Ridout and Franz (2008); Sigelman and Kugler (2003); Lipsitz and Geer (2017); Allen 
and Stevens (2015); Walter and Vliegenthart (2010); Gélineau and Blais (2015). Yet, such 
assessments are imperative in view of widespread scholarly disagreement about substantive findings 
and the suggestion that these disagreements are at least in part attributable to differences in 
measurement (Ridout and Franz 2008; Sigelman and Kugler 2003). Moreover, such assessments are 
invaluable for future studies to choose optimally from different approaches to measure the tone of 
parties’ campaigns. This study contributes to such an evaluation by comparing different measures of 
campaign tone in the context of the British General Election of 2015. As far as we know, this is the 
most extensive study of this kind in a multi-party context, and one of the few that includes expert 
judgements. We compare measures of parties’ campaign tone based on newspaper coverage, 
citizens’ perceptions, and expert judgements. We demonstrate that citizens’ perceptions and expert 
judgements are strongly biased by partisan preferences, and we present a procedure to eliminate 
such biases. After this correction, we find that parties’ campaign tones are described very similarly 
when using citizens’ perceptions, expert judgements and five of the six newspapers included in the 
study. This study concludes that convergent validity of most of our measures is highly satisfactory, 
but also that not all newspapers cover parties’ campaigns in similar ways, which demonstrates the 
problematic nature of aggregation across different newspapers. 
 This paper starts with a brief discussion on conceptualisation, before reviewing existing 
studies of measurement and instrumentation. It then discusses measuring the tone of parties’ 
campaigns from different kinds of empirical information: voter perceptions, expert judgements, and 
newspaper content. We then present a novel and simple procedure for eliminating partisan biases in 
perception and judgement data. Finally, we compare the information from our different measures 
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and find substantial levels of agreement between most of them (i.e., acceptable levels of convergent 
validity).  
 
Conceptual considerations 
Evaluating existing measures of negative campaigning requires clarity of what should be measured. 
This involves two inter-connected aspects. The first is the specification of the phenomenon to be 
measured (cf. Adcock and Collier 2001). We subscribe to the most common, and generally accepted 
definition in the literature, that specifies negative campaigning as attacking one’s political 
opponent(s) based on their character, abilities, accomplishments and policy stands (cf. Lau and 
Pomper 2004; Geer 2006). A party (or candidate) is thus more negative in its campaigning the more 
it focuses on critiquing opponents, and the less it focuses on its own abilities, accomplishments and 
policy stands.  
The second aspect of conceptual clarification involves the (epistemological) clarification of 
the ‘cases’ that are to be measured or described. The definition of negative campaigning implies that 
the concept applies to actors –parties, candidates, other individuals, groups or institutions– that are 
involved in election campaigns. This may appear obvious, but it is sometimes disregarded in the 
literature when measures of ‘negativity’ are introduced that pertain not to actors, but to the ‘overall’ 
campaign (i.e., the ensemble of behaviours of all competing actors).1 Of course, an overall campaign 
can, in principle, also be characterised in its ‘negativity’, but then only based on first having 
                                                          
1 Studies that ignore the actor-focus include Sigelman and Kugler (2003), and Donovan et al. (2016). An 
interesting study by Sides et al. (2010) asks respondents about perceptions of negative campaigning by specific 
candidates, as well as about the negativity of the campaign as a whole; but fails, however, to assess whether 
the latter adds relevant information beyond the former.  
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measured the extent of negative campaigning of the actors involved and combining these separate 
measures in a theoretically and empirically defensible manner (cf. Lazarsfeld and Menzel 1961).  
 In this paper we focus on political parties as actors, which are represented in their 
campaigns by candidates, officials, and spokespersons. The election campaign of a party is thus the 
subject of measurements, which we refer to, interchangeably, as negative campaigning, negativity or 
campaign tone. We acknowledge that, in some way, the notion of ‘the’ campaign of a party is 
problematic since some of parties’ campaign communications are micro-targeted to very specific 
audiences (cf. Elmelund-Praesteker 2010). What we focus on here is the campaign that is not 
personalised or narrowly targeted but aimed at a ‘general’ audience. In this respect we follow the 
same approach that is dominant in the extant literature.  
 
Existing work  
Research on negative campaigning uses a large variety of empirical indicators, including voters’ 
perceptions (e.g. Pattie et al. 2011; Donovan et al. 2016), experts’ judgements (Nai and Maier 2018; 
Lipsitz and Geer 2016), content analysis of controlled campaign communications (Walter 2014; 
Dolezal et al. 2016; Hoppmann et al. 2018), and uncontrolled campaign communications (Sigelman 
and Shiraev 2002; De Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis 2013; Song et al. 2017). An obvious question, 
addressed by most studies that focus on instrumentation and measurement issues, is whether using 
different kinds of empirical information leads to different substantive findings. Yet, their conclusions 
are far from congruent.  
Some studies conclude that substantive results about campaign tone are the same across 
different empirical indicators. Ridout and Franz (2008), for example, measure campaign tone using, 
respectively, campaign advertisements that were aired, advertisements that were produced; voters’ 
perceptions; and election coverage in newspapers. They find –for U.S. Senate races in the 1998-2002 
period– that all these measures are closely related and that substantive findings are rarely affected 
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by replacing one measure with another. In a similar vein Walter and Vliegenthart (2010) compare 
campaign tone as indicated by television ads, televised election debates and newspaper coverage in 
the 2006 Dutch parliamentary election campaign. The extent of negative campaigning is very similar 
for all these indicators, but the specific forms of negative campaigning vary, with personalized 
attacks being most prominent in newspapers.  
Other studies, however, do not find such congruence of findings when using different kinds 
of information. Sigelman and Kugler (2003) use the 1998 American National Election Study Pilot to 
compare voters’ perceptions of the campaign tone in their state with tone as measured by 
newspaper coverage and advertisements. They find no congruence, and attribute this to perceptions 
being biased by partisanship, political information (more informed people perceiving more 
negativity) and timing in the campaign (more perceived negativity towards later stages of the 
campaign). Lipsitz and Geer (2017) compare perceptions of negative campaigning between ordinary 
citizens and scholars who were presented ads from the 2012 US presidential election. Often, the two 
groups have strongly different perceptions (between 25% and 75% disagreement, depending on 
specific groups being compared) owing to partisan biases in both groups. 
Another group of studies compares negativity of texts measured by content analysis with 
judgements of relevant experts. Such comparisons are particularly important as a form of validation 
of coding procedures. Gélineau and Blais (2015) compare judgements of experts with a content 
analysis of television and web-based ads in the context of the 2012 Quebec General election. 
Rankings of parties’ campaign tone correlate strongly.  Similarly, Ansolabehere et al. (1994) use two 
expert judges (prominent consultants for, respectively the Republicans and Democrats) to validate 
their content analysis of news coverage data. They report that the two judges agree on the tone of 
all but one of 35 races in the 1992 Senate elections when asked to classify them as positive, negative 
or mixed. Finally, Lau et al. (1999) compared negativity of campaign ads as coded directly and the 
negativity of those same ads as inferred from secondary (newspaper) accounts. They report that 
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both measures lead to the same substantive conclusions, which suggests that newspaper coverage 
of parties’ campaign communication is not unduly biased.  
When taken all together, these studies do not lead to very strong conclusions or 
recommendations. Some scholars suggest that choice of indicators of negative campaigning can be 
based sensibly on convenience grounds (Ridout and Franz 2008; Lau et al. 1999; Gélineau and Blais 
2015; Ansolabehere et al. 1994). Others identify strong biasing factors, particularly in voters’ 
perceptions, but also in expert judgements (Sigelman and Kugler 2003; Lipsitz and Geer 2017). 
Walter and Vliegenthart (2010) identify channel-specific factors, not in the degree of negativity, but 
in the forms by which it expresses itself. In view of the relatively small number of studies that pay 
explicit attention to issues of measurement and instrumentation this variety of findings is perhaps 
not surprising. No two of these studies are directly comparable in terms of the kind of elections, the 
kind of empirical indicators, the precise procedures for comparison, and the wider socio-political 
context, and all these differences are likely to affect the findings and comparisons.  
 
Context: electoral system, party systems and media 
We study the 2015 General Election in the United Kingdom. These parliamentary elections are 
conducted in 650 single-member constituencies using the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral 
system. The parties, party systems and media systems differ across the four countries of the United 
Kingdom –England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland– which affects party competition and 
campaigning. To avoid resulting issues of comparability we restrict ourselves in this paper to England 
(which contains almost 84% of all eligible voters in the UK, and 82% of the seats in the House of 
Commons).  
Conservatives and Labour are the largest and politically most important parties, and the only 
ones with realistic hopes of leading the government and electing the Prime Minister. The previous 
elections of 2010 resulted in a hung parliament and a coalition government of Conservatives and 
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Liberal Democrats. It was generally expected that 2015 would again produce a hung parliament; and 
the actual outcome of an absolute majority won by the Conservatives was a total surprise (cf. Green 
and Prosser 2016; Cowley and Kavanagh 2018). Despite the prominent position of the two major 
parties, electoral competition is not restricted to these two parties. Over 27% of the votes in England 
in 2015 were cast for other than the two major parties, mainly the Liberal Democrats, UKIP (United 
Kingdom Independence Party) and the Greens (cf. Green and Prosser 2016). Moreover, about half of 
all citizens held virtually equally strong electoral preferences for at least two of the five parties (Van 
der Eijk and Fox, 2015). The English party system is thus a multi-party system, skewed towards the 
two major parties, but with other parties of considerable importance in terms of voter preferences 
and party competition.  
We focus for our measurements of negative campaigning on the period from the dissolution 
of parliament (30 March) to polling day (7 May). During this period, British voters experience the 
campaigns of the various parties through a variety of channels, including2  
 party-controlled communications, including televised or radio broadcasted Party Election 
Broadcasts (PEBs); print and online advertising; pamphlets, leaflets and billboards; Facebook 
pages and Twitter accounts of parties and candidates;  
 semi-controlled communications, including televised election debates; 
 uncontrolled communication, particularly newspaper and television coverage of parties, 
candidates and the campaign. 
 
The English media system is generally viewed as between the free market liberal model of the 
U.S. and the more regulated democratic corporatist model of many Northern European countries 
(Scammell and Langer 2006; Semetko et al. 1991; Curran et al. 2010). Newspaper circulation is 
                                                          
2 Non-party actors also contribute to the overall campaign and public debate about the election, but given our 
focus on campaigning by political parties we can ignore these.  
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relatively high in the UK in comparison to the United States, and the press is characterized by 
commercial ownership and national circulation (Scammell and Langer 2006; Sanders and Hanna 
2012). Newspapers can be divided along the lines of quality versus tabloid press, and in terms of 
partisanship. Most newspapers openly support one of the main parties, although their 
endorsements sometimes change across elections (Wring and Deacon, 2010; see Leach et al. 2011: 
163 for an overview over time). Because they serve distinct audiences, competition between the 
quality press and the tabloid press is minimal, while competition between tabloid newspapers is 
fierce and strengthened by their national distribution (Leach et al. 2011; Semetko et al. 1991). In 
contrast to newspapers, television news in Britain is highly regulated and required by law to be 
impartial (McNair 2003; Scammell and Semetko 2008).  
Paid political advertising on television is prohibited, but major parties receive free 
broadcasting time on public and commercial television (party election broadcasts)(Holtz-Bacha and 
Kaid 2006: 10; Scammell and Langer 2006: 65; Leach et al. 2011).  
 
Content analysis of newspaper campaign coverage  
Many researchers use media coverage of campaigns as their empirical basis for measuring the tone 
of parties’ campaigns (cf. Kahn and Kenney 1999; Buell and Sigelman 2009; Lau and Pomper 2004; 
Djupe and Peterson 2002; Sigelman and Shiraev 2002; De Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis 2013; Song et al. 
2017; Walter 2019; Papp and Patkos 2018). News values and commercial pressures contribute to 
such coverage to exaggerate negativity, however (cf. Lau and Pomper 2004; Benoit et al. 2006). 
Implicit in many studies using media coverage is the assumption that this negativity bias is the same 
across parties, making it a valid basis for measuring the (relative degree of) negativity in parties’ 
campaigns. In this study we assess whether campaign coverage results in similar descriptions of 
parties’ campaigns as when using other kinds of data. We therefore conduct a content analysis of 
newspapers coverage of the campaigns of English parties.  
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We selected six newspapers: The Sun, The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Guardian, The 
Daily Telegraph, and The Independent. These are the largest in categories defined by tabloid versus 
quality papers and partisan colour (see Supplementary Information Table A1 for more detailed 
characterisation of these papers). We coded 5019 articles that were kindly made available to us by 
the research group ‘Media in Context and the 2015 General Election’ at the University of Exeter, and 
that were identified as campaign coverage by a trained computational classifier applied to Lexis-
Nexis (see the Supplementary Information for details). Coding was performed by four trained PhD 
students, using an adapted version of Geer’s (2006) fine-grained and widely-used coding frame. The 
unit to be coded is the ‘appeal’ --any singular statement by a political party or politician containing 
self-praise or criticism of an opponent. 18943 appeals were coded qua tone (criticism of an 
opponent versus self-praise) and source (the party from which the criticism or self-praise originated). 
The Supplementary Information provides further details about the method, reliability, and 
distributions across newspapers and political parties.  
The coded material consists only of quotes and paraphrases from parties, and reflects thus 
campaign behaviour of the parties involved (as far as covered by a newspaper; this approach is also 
used by Lau and Pomper 2004; Buell and Sigelman jr. 2009; Sigelman and Shiraev 2002; Walter and 
Vliegenthart 2010; Walter 2019).3 We refrain from aggregating the results across newspaper titles, 
as that is only sensible if they are all highly similar in what they cover from parties’ campaign 
behaviour and communcations, which cannot be taken for granted. As it turns out, they are not, as 
we show below where we compare all our measures of parties’ negative campaigning.4  
                                                          
3 Other studies code all newspaper content about campaigns (see Ridout and Franz 2008; De Nooy and 
Kleinnijenhuis 2015; Song et al. 2017; Benoit et al. 2005). We feel that less appropriate for characterising 
party-specific campaigns.  
4 Sigelman and Shiraev (2002) also experience that campaign coverage by different papers leads to quite 
different measures of parties’ negative campaigning in their study of the 1996 and 2000 presidential 
campaigns in Russia. 
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Citizens’ perceptions of negative campaigning 
Surveys are frequently used for measuring the tone of parties’ election campaigns, particularly when 
researchers are also interested in the effect of campaign tone on respondents’ attitudes and 
behaviours. When using citizens’ perceptions to measure the tone of campaigns, they are implicitly 
regarded as ‘judges’ (in Coombs’ (1964) sense of the word). That assumes that respondents can be 
regarded as (stochastic) replications and that the variation in their ‘judgements’ is random and 
unrelated to any antecedent voter characteristics of relevance. If true, the average of individual 
perceptions is a useful measure of the tone of campaigns. This assumption is untenable, however, 
given the consistent findings of strong associations between perceptions of campaign tone and 
partisan orientations (cf. Sigelman and Kugler 2003; Lipsitz and Geer 2017). Perceptions can 
therefore not be used without further ado to characterise the tone of parties’ campaigns. However, 
we will shortly demonstrate that these biases can be modelled and offset, and that doing so leads to 
valid ‘adjusted’ measures of campaign tone.  
Our analyses are based on data from the 2015 British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP). 
We use information from waves 4, 5 and 6. Wave 4 was conducted before the formal campaign (4-
30 March 2015); Wave 5 took place during the formal campaign (31 March – 6 May 2015), and Wave 
6 is a post-election wave of the panel (8-26 May 2015). We use the 19123 English respondents who 
took part in all three of these waves. 
We asked respondents for their perceptions of the tone of the election campaigns of each of 
the five parties that campaigned in England, thus following the approach of, e.g., Brooks (1997) and 
Pattie et al. (2011), and not the approach of, e.g., the 1998 ANES Pilot Study (Sapiro et al. 1999) 
where a single perception of the entire campaign was solicited. As discussed earlier, we feel that the 
latter is not a valid measure of the campaigning behaviour of political parties; as it implicitly (and 
counterintuitively) assumes that citizens do not distinguish between parties or candidates when 
experiencing a campaign. 
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Questions about the perception of campaigns are quite often formulated in terms of 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ (cf. Sigelman and Kugler 2003; Ridout and Franz 2008; Sides et al. 2010; 
Stevens 2012; Ridout and Fowler 2010). As Redlawsk and Mattes (2014:52) report, such 
formulations contribute to partisan and social desirability bias. To minimize this, and to enhance 
construct validity by linking the operationalization closer to the theoretical construct of negative 
campaigning (see above) we employed the following question:  
 
‘In their campaigns political parties can focus on criticizing the policies and personalities of 
other parties, or they can focus on putting forward their own policies and personalities. 
What is, in your view, the focus of the national campaign of the [fill in party name]?’  
 
In England this question was asked for each of the following parties: Conservatives; Labour; 
Liberal Democrats; Greens; UKIP. Responses could be given on a 5-point scale: 1= ‘focuses on 
criticizing the policies and personalities of other parties’; 5=’focuses on putting forward their own 
policies and personalities’.  
When analyzing the responses, we find –as expected– that respondents’ party preferences 
are strongly related to the perception of parties’ campaign tones. Across all parties we find that the 
campaign of the party that a respondent voted for is perceived much more positively than the 
campaigns of other parties. Across all parties this difference is 1.22 (in wave 5) and 1.16 (in wave 6) 
on the 5-point response scale, a partisan difference that is highly significant (see Tables A4 and A5 in 
the Supplementary Information). This understates the extent of party preference bias, as this bias 
also affects perceptions of parties that respondents did not vote for but that they considered highly 
attractive as an option to vote for. For all parties we find a strong and virtually linear relationship 
between the electoral attractiveness of a party and the extent to which that party’s campaign is seen 
as focusing on its own policies and personalities (see discussion and Figure A1 in the Supplementary 
Information).  
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These strong partisan biases imply that respondents’ perceptions (or their central tendency) 
cannot be validly used to characterize and compare the tone of parties’ campaigns. But we can 
adjust these perceptions for this bias. A simple way to do so is by a regression-based procedure that 
will be described shortly. The resulting adjusted perception scores (from which partisan biases have 
been eliminated) can realistically be regarded as stochastic replications, so that their averages (per 
party) can be used as measures of parties’ campaign tones. We will then compare these measures of 
parties’ campaign tones with similar measures derived from newspapers (discussed above) and from 
expert judgements (to be discussed next).  
 
Expert judgements to measure negative campaigning 
Citizens’ perceptions of political phenomena are generally marked by misperceptions, 
misattributions, random noise and systematic biases (cf. Sigelman and Kugler 2003; Pattie et al. 
2011; Mattes and Redlawsk 2015; Huckfeldt et al. 1998). These shortcomings derive from lack of 
motivation, time or cognitive sophistication to follow the content of election campaigns. To 
circumvent these problems, social scientists resort increasingly to surveying experts. This use of 
experts is quite influential when looking at the impact of studies such as the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (see www.chesdata.eu) and the Quality of Government Expert Survey 
(https://qog.pol.gu.se/). Experts are also used to measure negative campaigning, although yet on a 
limited scale (see Gélineau and Blais 2015; Patterson and Shea 2004; Abbe et al. 2001; Weaver-
Lariscy and Tinkham 1996; Geer and Lipsitz 2017; Nai and Maier 2018). Nai recently started a large 
cross-national survey using expert judgements to measure negative campaigning.5  
                                                          
5 Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Survey Database (NEG_ex), see http://www.alessandro-
nai.com/#!negative-campaigning-comparative-data/x181a.  
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 In this study we used election agents as experts. Our choice requires that we clarify the role 
of this typically British institution, which does not have a direct equivalent in many countries. 
Moreover, we need to explain why these actors can be considered as experts, and what the main 
strengths and weaknesses are of considering them as such.  
In UK elections every candidate is required by law to have an election agent, who is legally 
responsible for the campaign of that candidate. Although a candidate may be his or her own election 
agent, this is very rarely done. Election agents are responsible for ensuring that a campaign is run 
within the law, a responsibility that extends to fundraising and the authorisation of expenses, 
approving the content of campaign communications, and filing required information to relevant 
regulatory authorities. Although their legal responsibilities do not include acting as a campaign 
manager (which is not a legally defined role), the two functions are often combined in a single 
person. Election agents can thus be regarded as a mixture of campaign managers and accounting 
officers (Fisher et al. 2006). Because of this they are generally directly involved in the management 
and organisation of the campaign in their constituency, including in implicit or explicit decision 
making about ‘going (or not going) negative’.  
 Given their deep involvement in partisan campaigns one may wonder why we consider 
election agents as experts. The term ‘expert’ is often associated with impartiality and absence of 
partisan preferences. Academics, journalists, or marketing specialists who are not directly involved 
in a campaign are then seen as plausible experts, but not campaign managers. We disagree with this 
perspective for three reasons. First, it defines experts somewhat as unicorns, mythical beings that 
we do not find in the real world. Indeed, various studies demonstrate that scholars, journalists and 
other allegedly impartial ‘experts’ are not at all without biases, including partisan biases (cf. Lipsitz 
and Geer 2017; Powell 1989; Budge 2000; Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Whitefield et al. 2007; 
Albright and Mair 2011). Secondly, the presence of bias in experts’ judgments is relatively innocuous 
if we can correct for it. This notion is well established in the field of the methodology of expert-
surveys where it is fully acknowledged that experts of all kinds may well be biased in their 
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judgements and that the way forward is to “model and purge known sources of bias” (Maestas et al. 
2014:358; see also Curini 2010). That is exactly what we will do when adjusting responses of election 
agents for partisan bias (just as we apply such adjustments to citizens’ responses). Thirdly, such 
adjustment for partisan bias allows us to define experts not on a negative criterion (i.e., absence of 
bias), but on a positive criterion instead. Experts should be more informed, based on first-hand 
experience of (in our case) election campaigns. Apart from general cognitive capabilities this 
requires two conditions: having wide-ranging opportunities to observe what happens in the 
campaigns of the various parties and having the motivation to be (and to remain) as fully informed 
as possible about these campaigns. For election agents both conditions are fulfilled amply, probably 
better than for many other alleged experts (such as academics) who often have to rely on secondary 
sources (including election agents) for empirical information. For these reasons we consider election 
agents as relevant experts. Our reasoning here is similar to that of Ansolabehere et al. 1994 who 
employed highly partisan campaign consultants as experts. 
A survey of election agents was conducted in 2015 by Fisher et al. (2016),6 which included 
exactly the same questions about the tone of the campaign of their own and of other parties as had 
been included in the British Election Study Internet Panel (see previous section). We use the data 
from all English agents (n=968), who represent candidates in 482 constituencies.  
Given their role in the campaign, it is not surprising that the answers provided by election 
agents are biased by their party affiliation. Across all parties we find that agents perceived the 
campaign of their own party as more focused on its own policies and personalities than the 
campaigns of other parties. These differences are on average 1.43 on a 5-point scale, which is even 
more pronounced than the corresponding differences amongst ordinary citizens, discussed in the 
                                                          
6 Constituency Campaigning in the 2015 British General Election Study, deposited in the UK Data Archive.  
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previous section.7 Therefore, and just as we did for citizens’ perceptions of campaign tones, we 
model and offset this bias, using the same regression procedure as discussed above, using as 
independent variable agents’ party affiliation (represented by dummies). Here too, this procedure 
results in adjusted judgements of campaign tone that can be realistically regarded as stochastic 
replications, and their averages (per party) are therefore useful indicators of parties’ campaign 
tones. In the next section we compare these expert-based measures of campaign tones with similar 
measures derived from newspapers and from citizens’ judgements (both discussed above).  
 
Adjusting citizen and expert responses for partisan bias  
Our procedure to adjust citizens’ and experts’ views of parties’ campaign tone requires two kinds of 
variables. First, we need to measure perceptions of campaign tone for each of the parties. In both 
our citizen and expert surveys we have five such perceptions, one for each of the parties that 
campaigned in England. Second, we need at least one indicator of respondents’ partisan 
orientations. This may be (actual or intended) party choice; multiple (non-ipsative) party 
preferences, or any other variable that is deemed to be a valid indicator of partisan orientations. 
Because many citizens in contemporary multi-party systems have strong preferences for more than 
just one party (cf. Kroh et al. 2007) multiple party preferences capture partisan orientations more 
comprehensively than a simpler indicator such as party choice. We therefore use the so-called 
‘propensity to vote’ measure (cf. Van der Eijk et al. 2006), which has been asked for each of the five 
parties in the mass survey we analyse. The expert survey we analyse provides us only a single 
indicator of partisan orientations, the party for which the expert works as an election agent.  
                                                          
7 Detailed descriptions of the judgements by election agents are reported in Table A6 in the Supplementary 
Information.  
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Regression can be used to eliminate partisan bias because it allows two components to be 
distinguished in the biased perception of campaign tone (the dependent variable). One component 
is the regression prediction, which is accounted for by partisan preferences. The other component is 
the residual, which is independent of such preferences and can thus be regarded as the perception 
from which partisan biases have been eliminated.8 However, the means of these perceptions from 
which biases have been eliminated cannot be used to characterise the tone of parties’ campaigns 
because they are (by definition) zero, for each of the parties.  
This problem can be solved by rearranging the data into a so-called stacked matrix, where 
the rows are dyads of respondents and parties.9 Each respondent is therefore represented (in our 
case) by five records; for Respondent 1 these records are: Respondent1-Conservative, Respondent1-
Labour, Respondent1-Liberal Democrat, Respondent1-UKIP, and Respondent1-Green. In this stacked 
matrix, the five campaign perception questions can now be represented as a single variable, which 
can be regressed on a similarly stacked variable that reflects ties with the respective parties. A visual 
illustration of this stacking is provided in the Supplementary Information. In this way a single 
regression relates the perceptions of all parties’ campaigns to partisan measures for the same 
parties. Although the mean of all residuals is zero, this is not the case for the residuals for each of 
the party-stacks; these party-specific means of residuals can thus be used as measures of parties’ 
campaign tones that are free from partisan biases.  
The consequences of this procedure to eliminate partisan bias for the scores of the parties 
are reported in Table A7 in the Supplementary Information, and their consequences for the 
                                                          
8 The logic of distinguishing ‘useful’ and ‘contaminated’ variance components that is applied here is similar to 
that in instrumental variable analysis. 
9 Stacking data lies at the heart of conditional logit analysis (when the dependent variable is ipsative), and has 
become well-established for the analysis of non-ipsative party preferences (cf. van der Eijk et al. 2006; van der 
Eijk 2017).  
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correlations between the various measures are reported in Table 1 which is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
Comparing Measures of Campaign Tones 
We used three kinds of empirical information to obtain eight different measures of the tone of the 
election campaigns of the English parties in the 2015 General Election. Media coverage of parties’ 
appeals yielded six measures, one for each newspaper that we coded. Citizens’ perceptions and 
expert judgements each yielded one measure, resulting in a total of eight measures of parties’ 
campaign tones. Which of these is most appropriate to use depends on one’s theoretical framework 
and research questions. But these may be compatible with several of these measures. The (relative) 
construct validity of each measure is then to be assessed mainly in terms of convergent validity, i.e., 
the extent to which these measures lead to similar (ideally: identical) results (cf. Campbell and Fiske 
1959). Traditionally such similarity is assessed by correlations, presented below (Table 1). Yet, 
correlations reflect only part of the differences and similarities between the various measures. 
Therefore, we first present in Figure 1 a visualisation of the (relative) negativity of each party’s 
campaign according to these eight measures. To compare these measures, they have first to be 
expressed in a common metric. The original measures based on newspaper coverage are 
percentages of ‘positive’ (or conversely ‘negative’) appeals per party and per newspaper (for details 
see section A1.3 of the Supplementary Information). The measures based on the mass and expert 
surveys consist of means of perceptions from which partisan biases have been eliminated (see above 
and section A4 of the Supplementary Information). To express these different measures uniformly, 
we standardised them to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (see Table A7 in the 
Supplementary Information for parties’ scores on these measures).  
[HERE ABOUT FIGURE 1] 
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Figure 1 shows the campaign tone for each party according to the various measures. A party 
with a ‘positive’ campaign tone (compared to the other parties) has a positive score, a party that is 
‘negative’ (compared to the other parties) has a negative score. We see that (to the right of Figure 1) 
each of the eight different measures describes the campaign of the Greens as positive. We also see 
that all eight measures describe the campaign of Liberal Democrats as negative, but that some do so 
much more distinctly than others. Based on the coverage of The Daily Mirror, The Daily Telegraph 
and The Guardian the negativity of the LibDems’ campaign was in excess of one standard deviation, 
while citizens and experts assessed their campaign as much less negative. The largest differences 
between the various measures involve the Conservatives, UKIP and Labour. According to the 
measure based on The Daily Mirror, the Conservatives waged a very positive campaign, but all the 
other measures consistently suggest that their campaign was negative. The opposite holds for UKIP: 
its campaign is described as positive by five of our eight measures, but as distinctly negative by 
(again) The Daily Mirror (and as slightly negative by The Sun and expert judgements).  
All eight measures agree that the Greens fought a positive campaign (according to seven out 
of our eight measures, theirs was the single most positive campaign) and that Labour and the 
LibDems were predominantly negative. Conservatives are often seen as waging a negative campaign 
(with the measure based on the The Daily Mirror being once again very different), and UKIP was 
more often than not seen as positive (but with three measures pointing in the opposite direction).  
Figure 1 also allows a comparison between the different measures, which clearly shows that 
The Daily Mirror’s coverage provided substantially different information about parties’ campaigns 
than the other newspapers, or than the experiences of citizens and experts.10 Figure 1 also shows 
                                                          
10 These findings prompted us to check the coding of party appeals covered by the Daily Mirror and an 
additional sample of appeals covered by other newspapers. This did not lead to any need to revise the coded 
data.  
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that campaign tone measures based on citizen perceptions11 and on expert judgements are very 
similar. Moreover, these two survey-based measures are also very similar to measures based on 
newspaper coverage (again, apart from The Daily Mirror and, to a lesser extent, The Sun). When we 
assess the correlations between the different measures, shown in Table 1, we see that, apart from 
the measure based on The Daily Mirror’s campaign coverage, all correlations are strongly positive 
and of a reasonably high magnitude, many exceeding 0.80.  
[TABLE 1] 
Table 1 also includes measures based on citizen perceptions and on expert judgements that 
were not adjusted to eliminate partisan bias. We find that the adjustments for partisan bias 
increased the correlations between some measures but decreased the correlations between others. 
It is noteworthy that the correlation between the citizen-based and expert-based measures 
increases from .70 to .83 when partisan bias is eliminated from both. The average correlation 
between citizen-based, and all six media-based measures does not increase as a consequence of 
adjustment for partisan biases.12 This average correlation declines from .80 to (a still quite 
                                                          
11 The measure based on citizens’ perceptions in Figure 1 and Table 1 is based on data from wave 6 of the 
panel (i.e., immediately after the elections). Using perceptions from wave 5 (during the campaign) yields 
exceedingly similar results (not reported separately).  
12 This was calculated as the square root of the average of the squared unrounded correlations reported in 
Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
respectable) .75 as a result of eliminating partisan biases. For expert judgements, however, 
adjustment for partisan biases strengthens the average correlation between the expert-based 
measure and media-based measures increases from .76 to .86.  
Most importantly, Table 1 shows that the various measures of campaign tone are strongly 
correlated with each other (with the exception of the measure based on coverage by The Daily 
Mirror). Moreover, elimination of partisan biases from citizen-based and expert-based measures 
strengthens, on balance, their relationship with other measures and with each other.  
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Discussion and Conclusion  
We measured the tone of parties’ campaigns in the 2015 General Election in England, using voters’ 
perceptions, expert judgements and newspaper campaign coverage of six national newspapers. This 
breadth of indicators makes this the most extensive study of the measurement of negative 
campaigning in a non-U.S. context, and one of the first to include expert judgements.  
 This study leads to several major conclusions. First, we find considerable similarity between 
measures based on different kinds of empirical evidence (and thus also on different epistemological 
perspectives). From the standpoint of convergent validity this implies that all three kinds of empirical 
bases for measuring campaign tone lead to viable indicators. Hence, when using these instruments 
in research, the findings will be in broad terms the same irrespective of which of these indicators is 
used. That, in turn, suggests that the lack of agreement in the extant literature about consequences 
of negative campaigning is more likely generated by incomplete specification of contexts and 
conditions of negative campaigning than by the use of different measurement instruments.  
 The second important conclusion is that, despite a considerable degree of convergent 
validity between the three kinds of measures, among measures based on newspaper coverage of 
campaigns the choice of newspaper may make a large difference. Measures of campaign tone based 
on the coverage of five of the six newspapers included in this study provide roughly the same 
description of the (relative) negativity or positivity of parties’ campaigns. When using the coverage 
of the sixth newspaper (The Daily Mirror), however, we observe a very different picture (similar 
differences between newspaper-based measures have been reported by Sigelman and Shiraev 
2002). It is obvious that these differences reflect contrasting criteria for the selection of events and 
communications to be included in the paper’s campaign coverage. What drives these differences in 
news selection remains to be ascertained, but a ‘simple’ partisan explanation is implausible, since 
The Daily Mirror leans towards Labour but its coverage of the Conservatives’ campaign included 
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many more ‘positive’ statements than any of the other newspapers. These differences demonstrate 
that the UK newspaper industry is far from monolithic in how it covers campaigns. That, in turn, 
highlights the risks of measuring campaign tone on the basis of a single newspaper’s coverage, 
assuming that the findings can be generalised to the entire industry. One might wonder whether 
‘averaging’ the various newspaper-based measures of campaign tone would be sensible. Implied in 
doing so is the assumption that the differences between various newspaper-based measures are 
generated by random error (rather than different criteria for coverage, and thus systematic bias). In 
the absence of a clear understanding of what drives the differences in newspapers’ campaign 
coverage, we feel that assumption to be rather dubious, and we would therefore not advocate such 
an ‘averaged’ composite measure.  
 The third major finding of our study is that both citizens’ perceptions and expert judgements 
of the tone of parties’ campaigns are strongly biased by partisan orientations. This is in line with 
many similar findings in the literature. We demonstrated that these biases can be modelled and 
eliminated, and that doing so increases their mutual correlation, and, on balance, also increases 
their correlations with measures based on newspaper campaign coverage. Eliminating such biases 
thus increases the (convergent) validity of these perceptual or judgement measures. In turn, this 
calls into question the common apprehension that citizens’ perceptions are wholly subjective 
(Brooks 1997) and only tenuously related to inter-subjectively shared information. An implication of 
these insights is that both mass surveys and expert surveys of parties’ campaign tone should include 
sufficient additional information to allow the identification, modelling and elimination of suspected 
biases. 
A final conclusion that stands out from our findings is that it is somewhat simplistic to speak 
about an election campaign in the singular. Different parties and candidates run campaigns with 
different mixes of positive and negative contents, and such differences are clearly observable, 
irrespective of whether one uses newspaper coverage, perceptions or expert judgements.  
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Figure 1: Parties’ campaign tone according to eight different measures 
(expressed in standard deviation from the mean) 
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Table 1: Correlations between different measures of parties’ campaign tone (5 parties) 
  
Daily Mirror 1        
  
Daily Mail .00 1       
  
Daily Telegraph .12 .96 1      
  
The Independent .24 .82 .89 1     
  
The Guardian .39 .86 .94 .97 1    
  
The Sun .24 .95 .90 .77 .87 1   
  
Citizen perceptions (a)* .03 .75 .82 .97 .87 .64 1    
Expert judgements (a)* .21 .85 .80 .89 .87 .87 .83 1   
Citizen perceptions (r)* .20 .80 .88 1.00 .95 .72 .98 .85 1  
Expert judgements (r)* .01 .82 .70 .75 .71 .82 .72 .96 .70 1 
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*: Measures indicated as ‘(a)’ have been adjusted to eliminate partisan bias; measures indicated as ‘(r)’ have  
not been adjusted for partisan bias.  
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